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Abstract
In the convex optimization approach to online regret minimization, many methods
have been developed to guarantee a O(
√
T ) bound on regret for subdifferentiable
convex loss functions with bounded subgradients, by using a reduction to linear
loss functions. This suggests that linear loss functions tend to be the hardest ones
to learn against, regardless of the underlying decision spaces. We investigate this
question in a systematic fashion looking at the interplay between the set of pos-
sible moves for both the decision maker and the adversarial environment. This
allows us to highlight sharp distinctive behaviors about the learnability of piece-
wise linear loss functions. On the one hand, when the decision set of the deci-
sion maker is a polyhedron, we establish Ω(
√
T ) lower bounds on regret for a
large class of piecewise linear loss functions with important applications in on-
line linear optimization, repeated zero-sum Stackelberg games, online prediction
with side information, and online two-stage optimization. On the other hand, we
exhibit o(
√
T ) learning rates, achieved by the Follow-The-Leader algorithm, in
online linear optimization when the boundary of the decision maker’s decision set
is curved and when 0 does not lie in the convex hull of the environment’s decision
set. Hence, the curvature of the decision maker’s decision set is a determining
factor for the optimal learning rate. These results hold in a completely adversarial
setting.
1 Introduction
Online convex optimization has emerged as a popular approach to online learning, bringing together
convex optimization methods to tackle problems where repeated decisions need to be made in an
unknown, possibly adversarial, environment. A full-information online convex optimization prob-
lem is a repeated zero-sum game between a learner (the player) and the environment (the opponent).
There are T time periods. At each round t, the player has to choose ft in a convex set F . Subsequent
to the choice of ft, the environment reveals zt ∈ Z and the loss incurred to the player is ℓ(zt, ft), for
a loss function ℓ that is convex in its second argument. Both players are aware of all the parameters
of the game, namely ℓ, Z , and F , prior to starting the game. Additionally, at the end of each period,
the opponent’s move is revealed to the player. The performance of the player is measured in terms
of a quantity coined regret, defined as the gap between the accumulated losses incurred by the player
and the best performance he could have achieved in hindsight with a non-adaptive strategy:
rT ((zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T ) =
T∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f).
In this field, one of the primary focus is to design algorithms, i.e., strategies to select (ft)t=1,··· ,T
so as to keep the regret as small as possible even when facing an adversarial opponent. Particular
emphasis is placed on how the regret scales with T because this dependence relates to a notion of
learning rate. If rT = o(T ), the player is, in some sense, learning the game in the long-run since
the gap between experienced and best achievable average cumulative payoffs vanishes as T → ∞.
Furthermore, the smaller the growth rate of rT , the faster the learning. A natural question to ask is
what is the best learning rate that can be achieved for a given game (ℓ,Z,F). Mathematically, this
is equivalent to characterizing the growth rate of the smallest regret that can be achieved by a player
against a completely adversarial opponent, expressed as:
RT (ℓ,Z,F) = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
· · · inf
fT∈F
sup
zT∈Z
[
T∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f) ], (1)
which we refer to as the value of the game (ℓ,Z,F). Aside from pure learning considerations,
the growth rate of RT (ℓ,Z,F) has important consequences in a variety of fields where no-regret
algorithms are used to compute complex quantities, e.g. Nash equilibria in Game Theory [14]
or solutions to optimization problems in convex optimization [7], in which case this growth rate
translates into the number of iterations required to compute the quantity with a given precision. We
investigate this question in a systematic fashion by looking at the interplay between F and Z for the
following class of piecewise linear loss functions:
ℓ(z, f) = max
x∈X (z)
(C(z)f + c(z))Tx, (2)
where, for any z ∈ Z , C(z) is a matrix, c(z) is a vector, and X (z) ⊂ Rd is either a finite set or
a polyhedron {x ∈ Rd | A(z)x ≤ b(z)} with A(z) a matrix and b(z) a vector. This type of loss
functions arises in a number of important contexts such as online linear optimization, repeated zero-
sum Stackelberg games, online prediction with side information, and online two-stage optimization,
as illustrated in Section 1.1. Throughout the paper, we make the following standard assumption so
as to have the game well-defined.
Assumption 1 Z is a non-empty compact subset of Rdz andF is a non-empty, convex, and compact
subset of Rdf . For any choice of z ∈ Z , the set X (z) is not empty. The loss function ℓ is bounded
on Z × F . Moreover, either Z has finite cardinality or ℓ(·, f) is continuous for any f ∈ F .
Contributions. A number of no-regret algorithms developed in the literature can be used as a
black box for the settings considered in this paper in order to get O(
√
T ) bounds on regret, e.g.
Exponential Weights [20], Online Gradient Descent [22], and more generally Online Mirror Descent
[9], to cite a few. To get better learning rates, other approaches have been proposed but they usually
rely on either the curvature of ℓ, for instance if ℓ is strongly convex in its second argument [8],
which is not the case here, or more information about the sequence (zt)t=1,··· ,T , see for example
[17], which is not available in the fully adversarial setting. Aside from particular instances, e.g. [6]
and [1], it is in general unknown how the interplay between ℓ, Z , and F determines the growth rate
of RT (ℓ,Z,F). The main insight from this paper is that the curvature of the decision maker’s set
of moves is a determining factor for the growth rate of RT (ℓ,Z,F): if F has rough edges then
we are doomed to a rate of Θ(
√
T ), otherwise, if it is curved, the rate can be exponentially smaller.
Specifically, we show that:
1. When F is a polyhedron, either RT (ℓ,Z,F) = 0 or RT (ℓ,Z,F) = Ω(
√
T ). This lower
bound applies to online combinatorial optimization whereF is a combinatorial set, to many
experts settings and repeated zero-sum Stackelberg games where the player resorts to a
randomized strategy, as well as to many online prediction problems with side information
and online two-stage optimization problems.
2. When (i) ℓ is linear, (ii) F = {f ∈ Rdf | F (f) ≤ 0}, for F either a strongly convex
function or F (f) = ‖f‖F −C where C ≥ 0 and ‖ ‖F is a q−uniformly convex norm with
q ∈ [2, 3], and (iii) 0 does not lie in the convex hull of Z , we have RT (ℓ,Z,F) = o(
√
T ),
achieved by the Follow-The-Leader algorithm [12]. This result applies to repeated zero-
sum games where the player picks a cost vector (e.g. arc costs) of bounded euclidean norm
and the opponent chooses an element in a combinatorial set (e.g. a path). This also applies
to non-linear loss functions when 0 does not lie in the convex hull of the set of subgradients
of ℓ with respect to the second-coordinate by a standard reduction to linear loss functions,
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see [22]. Note that assumption (iii) is required to get o(√T ) rates as it is well known that
RT (ℓ,Z,F) = Ω(
√
T ) for linear losses when 0 lies in the interior of the convex hull of Z ,
see Section 2.
1.1 Applications
We list examples of situations where losses of the type (2) arise.
Online linear optimization In this setting, the loss function is given by ℓ(z, f) = zTf . This
includes, in particular:
• online combinatorial optimization where the opponent picks a cost in [0, 1]dz and F is
defined as the convex hull of a finite set of elements (e.g. paths, spanning trees, and match-
ings),
• experts settings where the player picks a distribution over the experts’ advice (in which
case F is also a polyhedron) and the opponent reveals a cost for each of the experts.
In online linear optimization, regret lower bounds are often derived by introducing a randomized
zero-mean i.i.d. opponent, see [1]. However, this is possible only if 0 is in interior of the convex
hull of Z , which is typically not the case in online combinatorial optimization. A general feature of
online linear optimization that will turn out to be important in the analysis is that there is no loss of
generality in assuming that Z is a convex set in the following sense.
Lemma 1 When ℓ(z, f) = zTf , the games (ℓ,Z,F) and (ℓ, conv(Z),F) are equivalent, i.e.:
RT (ℓ,Z,F) = RT (ℓ, conv(Z),F).
Repeated zero-sum Stackelberg games A repeated zero-sum Stackelberg game is a repeated
zero-sum game with the particularity that one of the players, referred to as the leader, has to commit
first to a randomized strategy f without even knowing which of the N other players, indexed by z, he
is going to face at the next round. The interaction between the leader and player z ∈ {1, · · · , N} is
captured by a payoff matrixM(z). Once the leader is set on a strategy, the identity of the other player
is revealed and the latter best-responds to the leader’s strategy, leading to the following expression
for the loss function:
ℓ(z, f) = max
i=1,··· ,Iz
eTiM(z)f,
where Iz is the number of possible moves for player z. We illustrate with a network security problem
that has applications in urban network security [10] and fare evasion prevention in transit networks
[11]. Consider a directed graph G = (V,E). The leader has a limited number of patrols that can
be assigned to arcs in order to intercept the attackers. A configuration γ ∈ Γ corresponds to a valid
assignment of patrols to arcs and is represented by a vector (Y γij )(i,j)∈E with Y
γ
ij = 1 if a patrol
is assigned to arc (i, j) and Y γij = 0 otherwise. The leader chooses a mixed strategy f over the
set of feasible allocations. Attacker z ∈ {(i1, j1), · · · , (iN , jN )} wants to go from z1 to z2 while
minimizing the probability of being intercepted. This interaction is captured by the loss function:
ℓ(z, f) = max
x∈X (z)
∑
γ∈Γ
−fγxγ ,
with:
X (z) = {( max
(i,j)∈E
XπijY
γ
ij )γ∈Γ | π ∈ Π(z)},
where Π(z) is the set of directed paths joining z1 to z2 in G and Xπij = 1 if (i, j) ∈ π and Xπij = 0
otherwise. The presentation of repeated Stackelberg games given here follows the model introduced
by Balcan et al. [3] for general, i.e. not necessarily zero-sum, Stackelberg security games. In this
more general setting, the loss function may not be convex and a possible approach, see [3], is to
add another layer of randomization which casts the problem back into the realm of online linear
optimization.
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Online prediction with side-information This setting has a slightly different flavor as the oppo-
nent provides some side information x before the player gets to pick f ∈ F , subsequent to what the
opponent reveals the correct prediction y. Nonetheless, the lower bounds established in this paper
also apply to this setting through a reduction to the setting without side-information, as detailed
at the end of Section 2. In the standard linear binary prediction problem, where F is a L2 ball,
y ∈ {−1, 1}, and x lies in a L2 ball, loss functions of the form (2) are commonly used, e.g. the
absolute loss ℓ((x, y), f) = |y − xTf | and the hinge loss ℓ((x, y), f) = max(0, 1− yxTf). This is
also true for linear multiclass prediction problems with the multiclass hinge loss:
ℓ(f, (x, y)) = max
j=1,··· ,N
(1{j 6= y}+ f Tj x− f Tyx),
where N denotes the number of classes, y ∈ {1, · · · , N}, and f is a vector obtained by concate-
nation of the vectors f1, · · · , fN . In the online approach to collaborative filtering, a typical loss
function is ℓ(M, (i, j, y)) = |M(i, j) − y| where M is a (user, item) matrix with bounded trace
norm, (i, j) is a (user, item) pair, and y is the rating of item j by user i.
Online two-stage optimization This setting captures situations where the decision making pro-
cess can be broken down into two consecutive stages. In the first stage, the player makes a decision
represented by f ∈ F . Subsequently, the opponent discloses some information z ∈ Z , e.g. a de-
mand vector, and then the player chooses another decision vector x in the second stage, taking into
account this newly available information to optimize his objective function. The loss function takes
on the following form:
ℓ(z, f) = cT1f + min
x∈Rd
Af+Bx≤z
cT2x,
where c1 and c2 are cost vectors and A and B are matrices. Using strong duality, this loss function
can be expressed in the canonical form (2). This framework finds applications in the operation
of power grids, where z represents the demand in electricity or the availability of various energy
sources. Since z is unknown when it is time to set up conventional generators, the decision maker
has to adjust the production or buy additional capacity from a spot market to meed the demand, see
for example [13].
Congestion control We consider a variant of the congestion network game described in [4]. A
decision maker has to decide how to ship a given set commodities through a network G = (V,E).
His decision can be equivalently represented by a flow vector f . Because the amount of commodities
is assumed to be substantial, implementing f will cause congestion which will impact the other users
of the network, represented by a flow vector z. The problem faced by the decision maker is to cause
as little delay as possible to the other users with the additional difficulty that the traffic pattern z is
not known ahead of time. Each arc e ∈ E has an associated latency function that is convex in the
flow on this arc:
ce(f + z) = max
k=1,··· ,K
(cke · (fe + ze) + ske),
As a result, the total delay incurred to the other users can be expressed as:
ℓ(z, f) =
∑
e∈E
ze max
k=1,··· ,K
(cke · (fe + ze) + ske).
1.2 Related work
Asymptotically matching lower and upper bounds on RT (ℓ,Z,F) can be found in the literature for
a variety of loss functions although the discussion tends to be restrictive as far as the decision sets F
and Z are concerned. The value of the game is shown to be Θ(logT ) for three standard examples of
curved loss functions. The first example, studied by Abernethy et al. [1], is the quadratic loss where
ℓ(z, f) = z · f + σ‖f‖22 for σ > 0, with Z and F bounded L2 balls. The second, studied by Vovk
[21], is the online linear regression setting where the opponent plays z = (y, x) ∈ Z = [−Cy, Cy]×
B∞(0, 1) for Cy > 0 (B∞(0, 1) denotes the unitL∞ ball), the loss is ℓ((y, x), f) = (y−x·f)2, and
F is an L2 ball. The last one, from Ordentlich and Cover [15], is the log-loss ℓ(z, f) = − log z · f
with Z any compact set in Rd and F the simplex of dimension d. For non-curved losses, evidence
suggests that the value of the game increases exponentially to Θ(
√
T ). Indeed,Ω(
√
T ) lower bounds
are proved for several instances involving the absolute loss ℓ(z, f) = |z − f | in [5], typically with
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Z = {0, 1} and F = [0, 1]. For purely linear loss functions, Abernethy et al. [1] establish a Ω(√T )
lower bound on RT (ℓ,Z,F) when Z is an L2 ball centered at 0 and F is either an L2 ball or a
bounded rectangle. This result was later generalized in [2] and shown to hold for F a unit ball in
any norm centered at 0 and Z its dual ball. Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [6] investigate the experts
setting, i.e. Z = [0, 1]d and F is the simplex in dimension d, and proves the same Ω(√T ) lower
bound (which also holds if Z is the simplex in dimension d, see [2]). Rakhlin et al. [19] establish
Ω(
√
T ) lower bounds on regret when ℓ is the absolute loss for a prediction with side-information
setting more general than the one considered in this paper where the player picks a function f(·),
the opponent picks a pair (x, y), and the loss is ℓ(f(·), (x, y)) = |f(x) − y|. The list of results
listed above is far from being exhaustive but provides a good picture of the current state of the art.
For each loss function, the intrinsic limitations of online algorithms are well-understood, usually
with the construction of a particular example of F and Z for which a lower bound on RT (ℓ,Z,F)
asymptotically matches the best guarantee achieved by one of these algorithms. We aim at studying
lower bounds on the value of the game in a more systematic fashion using tools rooted in duality
theory and sensitivity analysis. All the proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
Notations For a set S ⊂ Rd, conv(S) (resp. int(S)) refers to the convex hull (resp interior) of this
set. When S is a compact, we define P(S) as the set of probability measures on S. For x ∈ Rd, ‖x‖
refers to the L2 norm of x while B2(x, ǫ) denotes the closed L2 ball centered at x with width ǫ. For
a collection of random variables (Z1, · · · , Zt), σ(Z1, · · · , Zt) refers to the sigma-field generated
by Z1, · · · , Zt. For a random variable Z and a probability distribution p, we write Z ∼ p if Z is
distributed according to p.
2 Lower bounds
Unless otherwise stated, we assume throughout this section that ℓ can be written in the form (2). In
particular, ℓ(z, ·) is continuous for any z ∈ Z . We build on a powerful result rooted in von Neu-
mann’s minimax theorem that enables the derivation of tight lower and upper bounds onRT (ℓ,Z,F)
by recasting the value of the game in a backward order.
Theorem 1 From [2]
RT (ℓ,Z,F) = sup
p
E[
T∑
t=1
inf
ft∈F
E[ℓ(Zt, ft)|Z1, · · · , Zt−1]− inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
ℓ(Zt, f) ],
where the supremum is taken over the distribution p of the random variable (Z1, · · · , ZT ) in ZT .
Any choice for p yields a lower bound on RT (ℓ,Z,F). The following result identifies a canonical
choice for p that leads to Ω(
√
T ) lower bounds on regret.
Lemma 2 Adapted from [2]
If we can find a distribution p on Z and two points f1 and f2 in argminf∈F E[ℓ(Z, f)] such that
ℓ(Z, f1) 6= ℓ(Z, f2) with positive probability for Z ∼ p, then RT (ℓ,Z,F) = Ω(
√
T ).
A distribution p satisfying the requirements of Lemma 2 can be viewed as an equalizing strategy for
the opponent. This concept, formalized in [18], roughly refers to randomized strategies played by
the opponent that cause the player’s decisions to be completely irrelevant from a regret standpoint.
These strategies are intrinsically hard to play against and often lead to tight lower bounds. To gain
some intuition about this result, suppose that that the opponent generates an independent copy of Z
at each round t, which we denote by Zt. In the adversarial setting considered in this paper, the player
is aware of the opponent’s strategy but does not get to see the realization of Zt before committing to
a decision. For this reason, at any round, f1 and f2 are optimal moves that are completely equivalent
from the player’s perspective. However, in hindsight, i.e. once all the realizations of the Zt’s have
been revealed, f1 and f2 are typically not equivalent because ℓ(Zt, f1) 6= ℓ(Zt, f2) with positive
probability and one of these two moves will turn out to be
max(0,
T∑
t=1
ℓ(Zt, f1)− ℓ(Zt, f2))
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suboptimal which, in expectations, is of order Ω(
√
T ) by the central limit theorem. Given the
conditions imposed on p, it is convenient to work with the following equivalence relation.
Definition 1 We define the equivalence relation ∼ℓ on F by fa ∼ℓ fb for fa, fb ∈ F if and only if
ℓ(z, fa) = ℓ(z, fb) for all z ∈ Z .
In what follows, we show, using sensitivity analysis for linear programming, that we can systemati-
cally, with the only exception of trivial games defined below, construct a distribution p with support
Z such that there are at least two equivalent classes in argminf∈F E[ℓ(Z, f)] whenever F is a
polyhedron, for Z ∼ p.
Definition 2 The game (ℓ,Z,F) is said to be trivial if and only if
∃f∗ ∈ F such that ∀z ∈ Z, ℓ(z, f∗) ≤ min
f∈F
ℓ(z, f).
A simple example of a trivial game is (ℓ(z, f) = zf, [0, 1], [0, 1]), where ℓ(z, f) ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ [0, 1] and
∀z ∈ [0, 1], with ℓ(z, f) = 0 if f = 0 irrespective of z. If the game is trivial, the player will always
play f∗ irrespective of the time horizon and of the opponent’s strategy observed so far to obtain zero
regret. As it turns out, this uniquely identifies trivial games as we establish in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 For any T ∈ N, RT (ℓ,Z,F) ≥ 0. Moreover in any of the following cases:
1. Z has finite cardinality,
2. ℓ(·, f) is continuous for any choice of f ∈ F ,
RT (ℓ,Z,F) = 0 if and only if the game is trivial.
The following result shows that, in most cases of interest, we can drastically restrict the power of the
opponent while still preserving the nature of the game. This enables us to focus on the case where
Z is finite.
Lemma 4 Suppose that ℓ(·, f) is continuous for any choice of f ∈ F . If the game (ℓ,Z,F) is not
trivial, there exists a finite subset Z˜ ⊆ Z such that the game (ℓ, Z˜,F) is not trivial.
We are now ready to present the main results of this section. To the best of our knowledge, these
results constitute the first systematic Ω(
√
T ) lower bounds on regret obtained for a large class of
piecewise linear loss functions.
Theorem 2 Suppose that F is a polyhedron. In any of the following cases:
1. Z has finite cardinality,
2. ℓ(·, f) is continuous for any choice of f ∈ F ,
either the game is trivial or RT (ℓ,Z,F) = Ω(
√
T ).
An immediate consequence of Theorem 2 for linear games is the following:
Theorem 3 Suppose that F is a polyhedron and that ℓ(z, f) = zTf . Then, either the game is trivial
or RT (ℓ,Z,F) = Ω(
√
T ).
The proofs rely on Lemma 2 which is based on Theorem 1 and may, as a result, seem rather obscure.
We stress that these lower bounds are derived by means of an equalizing strategy. We present this
more intuitive view in the Appendix by exhibiting an equalizing strategy in the online linear opti-
mization setting when int(conv(Z)) 6= ∅.
Note that Theorems 2 and 3 imply Ω(
√
T ) regret for a number of repeated Stackelberg games and
online linear optimization problems as discussed in Section 1.1. Furthermore, we stress that The-
orem 2 can also be used when F is not a polyhedron but this typically requires a preliminary step
which boils down to restricting the opponent’s decision set. For instance, the following well-known
result is almost a direct consequence of Theorem 3.
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Lemma 5 Suppose that ℓ(z, f) = zTf , that 0 ∈ int(conv(Z)), and that F contains at least two
elements. Then RT (ℓ,Z,F) = Ω(
√
T ).
Note that Lemma 5 is consistent with Theorem 3 as the game (ℓ(z, f) = zTf,Z,F) is non-trivial if
0 ∈ int(conv(Z)) as soon as F contains at least two elements. Indeed:
ℓ(ǫ
f2 − f1
‖f2 − f1‖ , f2) > ℓ(ǫ
f2 − f1
‖f2 − f1‖ , f1) and ℓ(ǫ
f1 − f2
‖f2 − f1‖ , f1) > ℓ(ǫ
f1 − f2
‖f2 − f1‖ , f2),
for a small enough ǫ > 0 and any pair f1 6= f2 ∈ F . When 0 ∈ int(Z), the opponent has
some freedom to play, at each time period, a random vector with expected value zero, making every
strategy available to the player equally bad. In other words, any i.i.d. zero-mean distribution is an
equalizing strategy for the opponent in this case.
A preliminary step is also required to derive Ω(
√
T ) lower bounds on regret for prediction problems
with side information where F is typically not a polyhedron. We sketch this simple argument for
the canonical classification problem with the hinge loss, i.e. the game :
(ℓ((x, y), f) = max(0, 1− yxTf),Z = B2(0, 1)× {−1, 1},F = B2(0, 1)),
but the method readily extends to any of the prediction problems described in Section 1.1. The idea
is to restrict the opponent’s decision set by taking a fixed vector x of norm 1 and impose that, at
any round t, the opponent’s move be (x, yt) for yt ∈ {−1, 1}. Since ℓ((x, y), f) only depends on f
through the scalar product between f and x, the player’s decision set can be equivalently described
by this value, which lies in [−1, 1]. Formally, we define a new loss function ℓ˜(y, f) = max(0, 1−yf)
with Z˜ = {−1, 1} and F˜ = [−1, 1] and we have:
RT (ℓ,Z,F) ≥ RT (ℓ˜, Z˜, F˜).
Observe now that the game (ℓ˜, Z˜, F˜) is not trivial, that Z is discrete, and that:
ℓ˜(y, f) = max
α∈{0,1}
(α,−yα)T(1, f).
We conclude with Theorem 2 that RT (ℓ˜, Z˜, F˜) = Ω(
√
T ) which implies that RT (ℓ,Z,F) =
Ω(
√
T ).
Remark about Lemma 2 We point out that, in general, it is not possible to weaken the assump-
tions of Lemma 2 (which, in fact, applies to a much more general class of loss functions than the
one given by (2)). In particular, finding z ∈ Z such that there are two equivalence classes f1 and f2
in argminf∈F ℓ(z, f) does not guarantee that RT (ℓ,Z,F) = Ω(
√
T ) as we illustrate with a coun-
terexample. This is because the result of Lemma 2 is intrinsically tied to the central limit theorem.
Consider the following (non-trivial) online linear regression game:
(ℓ(z, f) = (zTf)2,Z = B2(z∗, 1),F = [f1, f2]),
where f1 = (1, 0, · · · , 0), f2 = (0, 1, 0, · · · ), and z∗ = (1, 1, 0, · · · , 0). Observe that ∀z ∈ Z, ∀f ∈
F , zTf ≥ 0. Hence argminf∈F ℓ(z, f) = argminf∈F f Tz. Furthermore, argminf∈F f Tz∗ =
[f1, f2] but f1 and f2 are clearly not in the same equivalence class. Yet, even though ℓ is not strongly
convex in f , there exists an algorithm achieving O(log(T )) regret, see [21].
3 Upper bounds
Looking at Theorem 2, Theorem 3, and Lemma 5, it is tempting to conclude that the existence of
pieces where ℓ is linear in its second argument dooms us to Ω(
√
T ) regret bounds. We argue that the
growth rate of RT (ℓ,Z,F) is determined by a more involved interplay between ℓ, Z , and F so that
this assertion requires further examination. In fact, we show that O(log(T )) regret bounds are even
possible in online linear optimization. The fundamental reason is that the curvature of the boundary
of F can make up for the lack of thereof of ℓ. Curvature is key to enforce stability of the player’s
strategy with respect to perturbations in the opponent’s moves. Sometimes, when the predictions
are stable, e.g. when ℓ is the square loss ℓ(z, f) = ‖z − f‖2, a very simple algorithm, known as
Follow-The-Leader, yields O(log(T )) regret.
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Definition 3 From [12]
The Follow-The-Leader (FTL) strategy consists in playing:
ft ∈ argmin
f∈F
1
t− 1
t−1∑
τ=1
ℓ(zτ , f).
It is well-known that FTL fails to yield sublinear regret for online linear optimization in general.
However, when F has a strongly curved boundary and 0 /∈ conv(Z), the FTL strategy becomes
stable, leading to O(log(T )) regret as we next show using sensitivity analysis.
Theorem 4 Suppose that (i) ℓ is linear, (ii) F = {f ∈ Rdf | F (f) ≤ 0} for F a strongly convex
function with respect to the L2 norm, and (iii) 0 /∈ conv(Z). Then, FTL yields O(log(T )) regret.
As an example of application of Theorem 4, consider a repeated network game where the player
picks the arc costs in a L2 ball, the opponent picks a path, and the loss incurred to the opponent is
the sum of the arc costs along the path. In this setting, FTL yields O(log(T )) regret even though
the game is not trivial. Theorem 4 also has some implications for non-linear convex loss functions
when the boundary of F is curved and 0 is not in the convex hull of the set of subgradients of ℓ with
respect to the player’s moves. Indeed suppose that, at any time period t, the player follows the FTL
strategy as if the loss function were linear and the past moves of the opponents were y1, · · · , yt−1,
i.e.:
ft ∈ argmin
f∈F
1
t− 1
t−1∑
τ=1
yTτf,
where, for any τ = 1, · · · , t − 1, yτ is a subgradient of ℓ(zt, ·) at ft. Then, for any sequence of
moves (z1, · · · , zT ), we have:
rT ((zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T ) ≤
T∑
t=1
yTtft − inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
yTtf
= O(log(T )).
It is, however, a priori unclear whether log(T ) is the optimal growth rate for games satisfying the
assumptions of Theorem 4. Quite surprisingly, i.i.d. opponents appear to be particularly weak for
this kind of games, incurring at most a O(1) regret lower bound as shown in the following lemma.
This is in stark contrast with the situations of Section 2 where the (tight) Ω(√T ) lower bounds are
always derived through i.i.d. opponents.
Lemma 6 Consider the game (ℓ(z, f) = zTf,Z,F) with 0 /∈ conv(Z) and F = B2(0, 1). Any
lower bound derived from Theorem 1 with i.i.d. random variables Z1, · · · , ZT ∼ p is O(1) for any
choice of p ∈ P(Z).
Abernethy et al. [2] remark that restricting the study to i.i.d. sequences is in general not enough to
get tight bounds for non-linear losses such as ℓ(z, f) = ‖z − f‖2. It turns out that this is also true
for linear losses when F is strongly curved and 0 /∈ conv(Z) as the value of the game is in fact
Θ(log(T )).
Theorem 5 When ℓ(z, f) = zTf , 0 /∈ conv(Z), and F = B2(0, 1), the value of the game is:
RT (ℓ,Z,F) = Θ(log(T )).
So far, we have studied two scenarios that are diametrically opposed in terms of the curvature of
the decision sets with polyhedra on one side in Section 2, with Θ(
√
T ) regret, and euclidean balls,
with Θ(log(T )) regret, on the other side of the spectrum. Interestingly, bridging this gap leads to
the rise of intermediate learning rates that can be quantified through the modulus of convexity of
F . Specifically, consider any norm ‖ ‖F . The modulus of convexity of the associated unit ball is
defined as:
δF : ǫ→ inf
‖f‖
F
,‖f˜‖
F
≤1
‖f−f˜‖
F
≥ǫ
1−
∥∥∥∥∥f + f˜2
∥∥∥∥∥
F
.
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The norm ‖ ‖F is said to be uniformly convex if its characteristic of convexity is equal to 0, i.e.:
sup{ǫ ≥ 0 | δF(ǫ) = 0} = 0.
Pisier [16] show that if ‖ ‖F is uniformly convex, there must exist q ≥ 2 and c > 0 such that
δF(ǫ) ≥ cǫq for all ǫ ∈ [0, 2], in which case we say that ‖ ‖F is q−uniformly convex. This
parameter quantifies how curved ‖ ‖F balls are and determines the growth rate of the value of the
game when F is a ‖ ‖F ball and 0 /∈ conv(Z).
Lemma 7 Consider the game (ℓ(z, f) = zTf,Z,F) with 0 /∈ conv(Z) andF = {f | ‖f‖F ≤ C},
where ‖ ‖F is a q-uniformly convex norm and C ≥ 0. Then, FTL yields regret O(log(T )) if q = 2
and regret O(T
q−2
q−1 ) if q ∈ (2, 3].
Situations where 0 lies on the boundary of Z when ℓ is linear Observe that this situation is
not covered by Lemma 5, Theorem 4, Theorem 5, nor Lemma 7. We stress that zero-mean i.i.d.
opponents are not helpful to derive Ω(
√
T ) regret when 0 lies exactly on the boundary of Z (in fact,
in the relative interior of an edge of Z), as we illustrate with an example. Therefore, the growth
rate of RT (ℓ,Z,F) remains unknown in this setup. Define Z = conv(z1, z2, z3, z4) with z1 =
(−1, 1, 0, 0), z2 = (1,−1, 0, 0), z3 = (0, 0, 0, 1), and z4 = (0, 0, 1, 0). Also define F = [f∗, f∗∗]
with f∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0) and f∗∗ = (1, 1,−1, 1). Observe that the game (ℓ(z, f) = zTf,Z,F) is not
trivial because argminf∈F f · z3 = {f∗} while argminf∈F f · z4 = {f∗∗}. For any zero-mean
i.i.d. opponent Z1, · · · , ZT , the only possibility is to have Zt ∈ [z1, z2]. We get, irrespective of the
player’s strategy:
E[rT ((Zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T )] = −E[ inf
f∈F
f ·
T∑
t=1
Zt].
We have f∗ ∈ argminf∈F f · z for any z ∈ [z1, z2]. Hence:
E[rT ((Zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T )] = −E[f∗ ·
T∑
t=1
Zt],
which finally yields E[rT ((Zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T )] = 0.
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4 Appendix: proofs
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The assumptions of Theorem 1 in [2] are satisfied for the game (ℓ,Z,F) using Assumption 1 and
the fact that any loss function ℓ of the form (2) is such that ℓ(z, ·) is continuous for any z ∈ Z .
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4.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof follows from the repeated use of the Von Neumann’s minimax theorem developed in [2].
To simplify the presentation, we prove the result when T = 2 but the general proof follows the same
principle. We have:
R2 = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
inf
f2∈F
sup
z2∈Z
[
2∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f) ].
Consider fixed vectors f1, f2 ∈ F and z1 ∈ Z and define the function M(z2) =
∑2
t=1 ℓ(zt, ft) −
inff∈F
∑2
t=1 ℓ(zt, f). Observe that M is convex. Indeed, z2 → ℓ(z1, f1) + ℓ(z2, f2) is affine and
z2 → inff∈F
∑2
t=1 ℓ(zt, f) is concave as the infimum of affine functions. Therefore:
sup
z2∈Z
M(z2) = sup
z2∈conv(Z)
M(z2).
We obtain:
R2 = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
inf
f2∈F
sup
z2∈conv(Z)
[
2∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f) ].
By randomizing the choice of z2, we can use Von Neumann’s minimax theorem to derive:
R2 = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
{ ℓ(z1, f1) + sup
p2∈P(conv(Z))
{ inf
f2∈F
Ez∼p2ℓ(z, f2)− Ez2∼p2 inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f) } }.
For a fixed f1 ∈ F , define:
A(z1) = ℓ(z1, f1) + sup
p2∈P(conv(Z))
{ inf
f2∈F
Ez∼p2ℓ(z, f2)− Ez2∼p2 inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f) }.
Observe that, for a fixed p2 ∈ P(conv(Z)), the function:
z1 → inf
f2∈F
Ez∼p2ℓ(z, f2)− Ez2∼p2 inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f)
is convex as the difference between a constant and the expected value of the infimum of affine
functions. Since the supremum of convex functions is convex, A is convex and supz1∈Z A(z1) =
supz1∈conv(Z)A(z1). We derive:
R2 = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈conv(Z)
[ ℓ(z1, f1)+ sup
p2∈P(conv(Z))
{ inf
f2∈F
Ez∼p2ℓ(z, f2)−Ez2∼p2 inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f)}].
To conclude, we unwind the first step, i.e. we use the minimax theorem in reverse order. This yields:
R2 = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈conv(Z)
inf
f2∈F
sup
z2∈conv(Z)
[
2∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f) ],
i.e. R2(ℓ(z, f) = zTf,Z,F) = R2(ℓ(z, f) = zTf, conv(Z),F). Moreover, Z is a compact set
which implies that conv(Z) is also a compact set by a standard topological argument. As a result,
the game (ℓ(z, f) = zTf, conv(Z),F) also satisfies Assumption 1.
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4.3 Proof of Lemma 2
We follow the analysis of Theorem 19 of [2]. Using Theorem 1 with p taken as the distribution of
i.i.d. copies of Z , we get the lower bound:
RT ≥ T inf
f∈F
E[ℓ(Zt, f)]− E[ inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
ℓ(Zt, f)]
≥ T sup
f∈{f1,f2}
E[ℓ(Zt, f)]− E[ inf
f∈{f1,f2}
T∑
t=1
ℓ(Zt, f)]
≥ E[max{
T∑
t=1
E[ℓ(Zt, f1)]− ℓ(Zt, f1),
T∑
t=1
E[ℓ(Zt, f2)]− ℓ(Zt, f2)}]
≥ E[max{0,
T∑
t=1
ℓ(Zt, f1)− ℓ(Zt, f2)}],
where we use the fact that inff∈F E[ℓ(Zt, f)] = E[ℓ(Zt, f1)] = E[ℓ(Zt, f2)]. Since ℓ(Z, f2) 6=
ℓ(Z, f1) with positive probability, the random variables (ℓ(Zt, f1) − ℓ(Zt, f2))t=1,··· ,T are i.i.d.
with zero mean and positive variance and we can conclude with the central limit theorem since ℓ is
bounded.
4.4 Proof of Lemma 3
The fact that RT ≥ 0 is proved in Lemma 3 of [2] and follows from Theorem 1 by taking the Zt’s
to be deterministic and all equal to any z ∈ Z . Clearly, if the game is trivial then RT = 0 because
this value is attained for f1, · · · , fT = f∗ irrespective of the decisions made by the opponent.
Conversely, suppose RT = 0. Consider p to be the product of T uniform distributions on Z . Then,
using again Theorem 1:
0 ≥ E[
T∑
t=1
inf
ft∈F
E[ℓ(Zt, ft)]− inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
ℓ(Zt, f) ],
as Z1, · · · , ZT are independent random variables. Since they are also identically distributed, we
obtain:
0 ≥ T · inf
f∈F
E[ℓ(Z, f)]− E[ inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
ℓ(Zt, f)].
Yet E[ inf
f∈F
∑T
t=1 ℓ(Zt, f)] ≤ inf
f∈F
E[
∑T
t=1 ℓ(Zt, f)] = T · inf
f∈F
E[ℓ(Z, f)] and we derive:
T · inf
f∈F
E[ℓ(Z, f)]− E[ inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
ℓ(Zt, f)] = 0.
Since ℓ is bounded, Z is compact, and ℓ(z, ·) is continuous for any z ∈ Z , f → E[ℓ(Z, f)] is
continuous by dominated convergence so we can take f∗ ∈ argminf∈F E[ℓ(Z, f)] (F is compact).
We obtain:
E[
T∑
t=1
ℓ(Zt, f
∗)− inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
ℓ(Zt, f)] = 0.
As
∑T
t=1 ℓ(Zt, f
∗)− inf
f∈F
∑T
t=1 ℓ(Zt, f) ≥ 0, we derive that:
(z1, · · · , zT )→
T∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f
∗)− inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f) = 0
almost everywhere on ZT . If Z is discrete, this implies equality on ZT , which in particular implies
ℓ(z, f∗) = inf
f∈F
ℓ(z, f) for all z ∈ Z and we are done. If, on the other hand, ℓ(·, f) is continuous for
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all f ∈ F , we have:
T∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f
∗) ≤
T∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f), ∀f ∈ F , ∀(z1, · · · , zT ) ∈ Z˜,
for Z˜ a subset of Z with Lebesgue measure equal to that of Z . Since a non-empty open set cannot
have Lebesgue measure 0, Z˜ is dense in Z and by taking limits in the above inequality for each
f ∈ F separately, we conclude that:
T∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f
∗) ≤
T∑
t=1
ℓ(zt, f), ∀f ∈ F , ∀(z1, · · · , zT ) ∈ Z,
which in particular implies that ℓ(z, f∗) = inf
f∈F
ℓ(z, f) for all z ∈ Z and the game is trivial.
4.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose by contradiction that we cannot find such a finite subset. Since Z is compact, it is also
separable thus it contains a countable dense subset {zn | n ∈ N}. By assumption, the game
(ℓ, {zk | k ≤ n},F) must be trivial for any n, i.e. there exists fn ∈ F such that:
ℓ(zk, fn) ≤ min
f∈F
ℓ(z, f), ∀k ≤ n.
Since F is compact, we can find a subsequence of (fn)n∈N such that fn → f∗ ∈ F . Without loss of
generality, we continue to refer to this sequence as (fn)n∈N. Taking the limit n → ∞ in the above
inequality for any fixed k ∈ N yields:
ℓ(zk, f
∗) ≤ ℓ(zk, f), ∀f ∈ F , ∀k ∈ N.
Consider a fixed f ∈ F , since {zn | n ∈ N} is dense in Z and since ℓ(·, f∗) and ℓ(·, f) are
continuous, we get:
ℓ(z, f∗) ≤ ℓ(z, f), ∀f ∈ F , ∀z ∈ Z,
which shows that (ℓ,Z,F) is trivial, a contradiction.
4.6 Proof of Theorem 2
Without loss of generality we can assume that the game is not trivial and that X (z) is finite for any
z ∈ Z since otherwise if X (z) is a polyhedron, the maximum in (2) must be attained at an extreme
point of X (z) (ℓ is bounded by Assumption 1) and there are finitely many such points for any z.
Moreover, we can also assume that Z is discrete by Lemma 4 since, borrowing the notations of
Lemma 4, we have:
RT (ℓ,Z,F) ≥ RT (ℓ, Z˜,F).
Write Z = {zn | n ≤ N} and denote by p0 the uniform distribution on Z , i.e. p0 =
1
N
∑N
n=1 δzn , where δzn is the Dirac distribution supported at zn. We may assume that there is
a single equivalence class in argminf∈F Ep0 [ℓ(Z, f)], otherwise we are done by Lemma 2. Take
f∗ ∈ argminf∈F Ep0 [ℓ(Z, f)]. Since the game (ℓ,Z,F) is not trivial, there exists zk in Z and
f∗∗ in F such that ℓ(zk, f∗∗) < ℓ(zk, f∗). Therefore, we can find ǫ > 0 small enough such that
(N − 1)ǫ < 1 and:
(1− (N − 1)ǫ)ℓ(zk, f∗∗) +
∑
n6=k
ǫℓ(zn, f
∗∗) < (1− (N − 1)ǫ)ℓ(zk, f∗) +
∑
n6=k
ǫℓ(zn, f
∗).
Define p1 as the corresponding distribution, i.e. p1 = (1 − (N − 1)ǫ)δzk + ǫ
∑
n6=k δzn . By
construction, the equivalence class of f∗ is not in argminf∈F Ep1 [ℓ(Z, f)]. Once again, without
loss of generality, we may assume that there is a single equivalence class in argminf∈F Ep1 [ℓ(Z, f)],
otherwise we are done by Lemma 2. Moreover, we can now redefine f∗∗ as a representative of the
only equivalence class contained in argminf∈F Ep1 [ℓ(Z, f)]. We now move on to show that there
must exist α ∈ (0, 1) such that there are at least two equivalence classes in argminf∈F Epα [ℓ(Z, f)],
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where the distribution pα is defined as pα = (1 − α)p0 + αp1. Observe that minf∈F Epα [ℓ(Z, f)]
can be written as the linear program:
min
q1,··· ,qN ,f
q · ((1 − α)x0 + αx1)
subject to q = (q1, · · · , qN )
qn ≥ (C(zn)f + c(zn))Tx ∀x ∈ X (zn), ∀n = 1, · · · , N
f ∈ F , q1, · · · , qN ∈ R
(3)
where x0 and x1 are vectors of size N defined as follows:
x0 =
1
N
(1, · · · , 1)
and
x1 = (1− (N − 1)ǫ)(0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · ) + ǫ(1, · · · , 1, 0, 1, · · · , 1),
i.e. all the components of x1 are equal to ǫ except for the kth one which is equal to (1− (N − 1)ǫ).
We are interested in the function φ : α → argminf∈F Epα [ℓ(Z, f)]. For any f ∈ F , define I(f) =
{α ∈ [0, 1] | f ∈ φ(α)}. Since α → Epα [ℓ(Z, f)] is linear in α, I(f) = {α ∈ [0, 1] | f ∈ φ(α)}
is a closed interval in [0, 1] for any f ∈ F . Moreover, F being a polyhedron, the feasible set of
(3) is also a polyhedron, hence it has a finitely many extreme points. We denote by {f1, · · · , fL}
the projection of the set of extreme points onto the f coordinate. Since (3) is a linear program,
this shows that, for any α ∈ [0, 1], there exists l ∈ {1, · · · , L} such that fl ∈ φ(α). Therefore,
we can write [0, 1] = ∪Ll=1I(fl). We can further simplify this description by assuming that the
fl’s belong to different equivalence classes (because I(f) = I(f ′) if f is equivalent to f ′). Now
observe that if I(fl) ∩ I(fj) 6= ∅ for all any l 6= j ≤ K , then there are two classes of equivalence
in argminf∈F Epα [ℓ(Z, f)] for any α ∈ I(fl) ∩ I(fj) and we are done. Suppose by contradiction
that we cannot find such a pair of indices. Because the only way to partition [0, 1] into L < ∞
non-overlapping closed intervals is to have L = 1, we get [0, 1] = I(f1). This implies that f∗ and
f∗∗ belong to the same equivalence class, a contradiction.
4.7 Alternative proof of Theorem 2 by exhibiting an equalizing strategy when ℓ is linear
Using Lemma 1, we can assume without loss of generality that Z is convex. When ℓ is linear, the
procedure developed in the proof of Theorem 2 boils down to finding a point z ∈ int(Z) such
that | argminf∈F zTf | > 1 and, with further examination, we can also guarantee that there exists
ǫ > 0, e ∈ Rn and f1, f2 ∈ argminf∈F zTf such that f1 ∈ argminf∈F(z − xe)Tf while f2 /∈
argminf∈F(z − xe)Tf for all x ∈ (0, ǫ] and symmetrically for x ∈ [−ǫ, 0). Consider a randomized
opponentZt = z+(ǫtǫ)e for (ǫt)t=1,··· ,T i.i.d. Rademacher random variables. Then for any player’s
strategy:
E[rT ((Zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T )] =
T∑
t=1
E[Zt]
Tft − E[ inf
f∈F
f T
T∑
t=1
Zt].
This yields:
E[rT ((Zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T )] =
T∑
t=1
zTft − E[ inf
f∈F
f T
T∑
t=1
Zt].
We can lower bound the last quantity by:
E[rT ((Zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T )] ≥ T (zTf1)− TE[ inf
f∈F
f T(z + (ǫ ·
∑T
t=1 ǫt
T
)e)],
as f1 ∈ argminf∈F zTf , but we could have equivalently picked f2 as f T1z = f T2z. Furthermore,
as |
∑
T
t=1
ǫt
T
| ≤ 1, f1 is optimal in the inner optimization problem when
∑T
t=1 ǫt ≤ 0 while f2 is
optimal when
∑T
t=1 ǫt ≥ 0. Hence:
E[rT ((Zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T )] ≥ T (zTf1)− TE[ f T1 (z + (ǫ ·
∑T
t=1 ǫt
T
)e) · 1∑T
t=1
ǫt≤0+
f T2 (z + (ǫ ·
∑T
t=1 ǫt
T
)e) · 1∑T
t=1
ǫt≥0 ].
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Observe that the term T (zTf1) cancels out and we get:
E[rT ((Zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T )] ≥ E[|
∑
t=1 ǫt|]
T
· ǫ · (f T1e− f T2e).
By Khintchine’s inequality E[|∑Tt=1 ǫt|] ≥ 1√2√T . Moreover f T1e − f T2e > 0 because f2 ∈
argminf∈F(z + ǫe)
Tf while f1 does not and f T1z = f T2z. We finally derive
E[rT ((Zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T )] ≥ (f
T
1e− f T2e)√
2
√
T .
This enables us to conclude RT = Ω(
√
T ) as this shows that for any player’s strategy, there exists a
sequence z1, · · · , zT such that
rT ((zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T ) ≥ E[rT ((Zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T )].
4.8 Proof of Theorem 3
Straightforward from Theorem 2 since ℓ is jointly continuous.
4.9 Proof of Lemma 5
Using Lemma 1, we can assume that Z is convex. Consider f1 6= f2 ∈ F and define e = f1−f2‖f1−f2‖ .
Since 0 ∈ int(Z), there exists ǫ > 0 such that ǫe and −ǫe are in Z . We restrict the opponent’s
decision set by imposing that, at any round t, the opponent’s move be ytǫe for yt ∈ Z˜ = {−1, 1}.
Since ℓ(ytǫe, f) only depends on f through the scalar product between f and e, the player’s decision
set can equivalently be described by F˜ = {f Te | f ∈ F} which is a closed interval (since F is
convex and compact) and thus a polyhedron. Defining a new loss function as ℓ˜(y, f) = yǫf , we
have:
RT (ℓ,Z,F) ≥ RT (ℓ˜, Z˜, F˜).
Observe that the game (ℓ˜, Z˜, F˜) is linear and not trivial, otherwise there would exist f∗ such that
eTf∗ ≤ eTf2 and −eTf∗ ≤ −eTf1 which would imply ‖e‖ = 0. With Theorem 3, we conclude
RT (ℓ˜, Z˜, F˜) = Ω(
√
T ) and thus RT (ℓ,Z,F) = Ω(
√
T ).
4.10 Proof of Theorem 4
A common inequality on the regret incurred for the FTL strategy is:
rT ((zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T ) ≤
T∑
t=1
zTt (ft − ft+1),
We use sensitivity analysis to control this last quantity. Specifically we show that the mapping
φ : z → argminf,F (f)=0 zTf is Lipschitz on Z . Using this property:
rT ((zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T ) ≤
T∑
t=1
‖zt‖ ‖ft − ft+1‖
= O(
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1t− 1
t−1∑
τ=1
zτ − 1
t
t∑
τ=1
zτ
∥∥∥∥∥)
= O(
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1t(t− 1)
t−1∑
τ=1
zτ − 1
t
zt
∥∥∥∥∥)
= O(
T∑
t=1
1
t(t− 1)
∥∥∥∥∥
t−1∑
τ=1
zτ
∥∥∥∥∥+ 1t ‖zt‖)
= O(
T∑
t=1
1
t
)
= O(log(T )),
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since Z is compact.
We now move on to show that φ is Lipschitz. As conv(Z) is closed and convex, we can strictly
separate 0 from conv(Z). Hence, there exists a 6= 0 ∈ Rd and c > 0 such that a · z > c, ∀z ∈ Z .
We get ‖z‖ ≥ c‖a‖ > 0 ∀z ∈ Z . Let us use the shorthand C = c‖a‖ . Take (z1, z2) ∈ Z2
and (f(z1), f(z2)) ∈ φ(z1) × φ(z2). Observe that the constraint qualifications are automatically
satisfied at f(z1) and f(z2) as ∇F cannot vanish on {f | F (f) = 0} since F does cannot attain its
minimum on this set (F is assumed to contain at least two points). Hence, there exist λ1, λ2 ≥ 0
such that z1 + λ1∇F (f(z1)) = 0 and z2 + λ2∇F (f(z2)) = 0. As z1, z2 6= 0, we must have
λ1, λ2 6= 0. We obtain ∇F (f1) = − 1λ1 z1 and ∇F (f(z2)) = − 1λ2 z2. Since F is strongly convex,
there exists β > 0 such that:
(∇F (f ′)−∇F (f ′′))T(f ′ − f ′′) ≥ β ‖f ′ − f ′′‖2 ,
for all f ′, f ′′ ∈ F . Applying this inequality for f ′ = f(z1) and f ′′ = f(z2), we obtain:
(
1
λ2
z2 − 1
λ1
z1)
T(f(z1)− f(z2)) ≥ β ‖f(z1)− f(z2)‖2 .
We can break down the last expression in two pieces:
1
λ2
zT2(f(z1)− f(z2)) +
1
λ1
zT1(f(z2)− f(z1)) ≥ β ‖f(z1)− f(z2)‖2 .
Observe that zT2(f(z1) − f(z2)) ≥ 0 since both f(z1) and f(z2) belong to F and since f(z2)
is the minimizer of zT2f for f ranging in F . Symmetrically, zT1(f(z2) − f(z1)) ≥ 0. Note that
1
λ1
= 1|λ1| =
‖∇F (f(z1))‖
‖z1‖ . As ∇F is continuous and F is compact, there exists K > 0 such that
‖∇F (f)‖ ≤ K for any f ∈ F . Hence, we get 1
λ1
≤ K
C
and the same inequality holds for λ2.
Plugging this upper bound back into the last inequality yields:
K
C
(z2 − z1)T(f(z1)− f(z2)) ≥ β‖f(z1)− f(z2)‖2.
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and simplifying on both sides by ‖f(z2)− f(z1)‖ yields:
K
βC
‖z2 − z1‖ ≥ ‖f(z1)− f(z2)‖,
i.e. K
βC
‖z2 − z1‖ ≥ ‖φ(z1)− φ(z2)‖.
4.11 Proof of Lemma 6
Using Lemma 1, we can assume that Z is convex. Since Z is compact and convex and since 0 /∈ Z ,
we can strictly separate 0 from Z and find z∗ 6= 0 such that Z ⊆ B2(z∗, α ‖z∗‖) with α < 1.
By rescaling Z , we can assume that α ‖z∗‖ = 1 and ‖z∗‖ > 1. In the sequel, σt−1 serves as a
shorthand for σ(Z1, · · · , Zt−1). We prove more generally that, for any choice of random variables
(Z1, · · · , ZT ) such that E[Zt|σt−1] is constant almost surely, the lower bound on regret derived from
Theorem 1 is O(1). Write Zt = z∗+Wt and E[Wt|σt−1] = ct with ‖Wt‖ ≤ 1 and ‖ct‖ ≤ 1. Define
w∗ = T · z∗ +∑Tt=1 ct. Observe that ‖w∗‖ ≥ T · ‖z∗‖ − ‖∑Tt=1 ct‖ ≥ T · (‖z∗‖ − 1) > 0. Write
Wt = Xt
w∗
‖w∗‖ + W˜t+ ct with W˜
T
t w
∗ = 0. Projecting down the equality E[Wt − ct|σt−1] = 0 onto
w∗, we get E[Xt|σt−1] = 0 and E[W˜t|σt−1] = 0. The bound that results from an application of
Theorem 1 is:
RT ≥ E[‖w∗ +
T∑
t=1
Wt − ct‖]−
T∑
t=1
‖z∗ + ct‖].
We now focus on finding an upper bound on the right-hand side. Expanding the first term yields:
‖w∗ +
T∑
t=1
Wt − ct‖ =
√√√√(1 + T∑
t=1
Xt
‖w∗‖)
2 · ‖w∗‖2 + ‖
T∑
t=1
W˜t‖2.
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By concavity of the squared root function:
E[‖w∗ +
T∑
t=1
Wt − ct‖] ≤
√√√√‖w∗‖2 · E[(1 + T∑
t=1
Xt
‖w∗‖)
2] + E[‖
T∑
t=1
W˜t‖2].
We expand the two inner terms:
E[(1 +
T∑
t=1
Xt
‖w∗‖ )
2] = 1 + 2
T∑
t=1
E[Xt]
‖w∗‖ +
1
‖w∗‖2 · E[(
T∑
t=1
Xt)
2].
Looking at each term individually, we have E[Xt] = E[E[Xt|σt−1] = 0 and E[(
∑T
t=1Xt)
2] =
E[(
∑T−1
t=1 Xt)
2] + 2E[XT · (
∑T−1
t=1 Xt)] + E[X
2
T ], yet E[XT · (
∑T−1
t=1 Xt)] = E[E[XT |σT−1] ·
(
∑T−1
t=1 Xt)] = 0. Hence, E[(1 +
∑T
t=1
Xt
‖w∗‖ )
2] = 1 +
E[
∑
T
t=1 X
2
t ]
‖w∗‖2 . Similarly E[‖
∑T
t=1 W˜t‖2] =∑T
t=1 E[‖W˜t‖2]. We obtain:
E[‖w∗ +
T∑
t=1
Wt − ct‖] ≤
√√√√‖w∗‖2 + T∑
t=1
E[X2t + ‖W˜t‖2].
Remark that ‖Wt − ct‖ ≤ ‖Wt‖+ ‖ct‖ ≤ 2. Hence, X2t + ‖W˜t‖2 ≤ 2. We obtain:
E[‖w∗ +
T∑
t=1
Wt − ct‖] ≤
√
‖w∗‖2 + 2T .
We have
√‖w∗‖2 + 2T = ‖w∗‖ ·√1 + 2T‖w∗‖2 ≤ ‖w∗‖ + T‖w∗‖ for T big enough as ‖w∗‖ ≥
T · (‖z∗‖ − 1). Yet ‖w∗‖ = ‖∑Tt=1 z∗ + ct‖ ≤∑Tt=1 ‖z∗ + ct‖. Hence, the lower bound derived
is:
E[‖w∗ +
T∑
t=1
Wt − ct‖]−
T∑
t=1
‖z∗ + ct‖ ≤ T‖w∗‖ ≤
1
‖z∗‖ − 1 = O(1).
4.12 Proof of Theorem 5
Since Z has non-empty interior, we can find z∗ 6= 0 and α ∈ (0, 132 ] such that B2(z∗, α ‖z∗‖) ⊆ Z .
Define e as a unit vector orthogonal to z∗ and Z˜ = {z |z = z∗ + (wα ‖z∗‖)e, |w| ≤ 1}. Since
Z˜ ⊆ Z , we have:
RT (ℓ,Z,F) ≥ RT (ℓ, Z˜,F),
and we can focus on developing a Ω(log(T )) lower bound on regret for the game (ℓ, Z˜,F). Using
the minimax reformulation of Theorem 1, we have:
RT (ℓ, Z˜,F)
= sup
p
E
[
−
T∑
t=1
‖z∗ + (α ‖z∗‖E[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1])e‖+
∥∥∥∥∥Tz∗ + (α ‖z∗‖
T∑
t=1
Wt)e
∥∥∥∥∥
]
= sup
p
E

 − T∑
t=1
√
‖z∗‖2 + (α ‖z∗‖E[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1])2 +
√√√√T 2 ‖z∗‖2 + (α ‖z∗‖ T∑
t=1
Wt)2


where the supremum is taken over the distribution p of the random variable (W1, · · · ,WT ) in
[−1, 1]T . Rearranging this expression yields:
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RT (ℓ, Z˜,F) = ‖z∗‖ sup
p
E

 T
√
1 + (α
∑T
t=1Wt
T
)2 −
T∑
t=1
√
1 + (αE[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1])2


= ‖z∗‖ sup
p
{E[ T (1 +
∞∑
n=1
(1
2
n
)
α2n(
∑T
t=1Wt
T
)2n)
−
T∑
t=1
(1 +
∞∑
n=1
( 1
2
n
)
α2nE[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1]2n)]}
= ‖z∗‖ sup
p
{α
2
2
E
[
(
∑T
t=1Wt)
2
T
−
T∑
t=1
E[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1]2
]
+
∞∑
n=2
(1
2
n
)
α2nE
[
(
∑T
t=1Wt)
2n
T 2n−1
−
T∑
t=1
E[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1]2n
]
},
where the second equality results from a series expansion (valid since
(αE[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1])2, (α
∑T
t=1
Wt
T
)2 ≤ α2 < 1) and the third inequality is derived from
Fubini, observing that:
∞∑
n=1
|
(1
2
n
)
|α2nE[(
∑T
t=1Wt
T
)2n] ≤
∞∑
n=1
α2n =
1
1− α2 <∞
and similarly:
∞∑
n=1
|
( 1
2
n
)
|α2nE[E[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1]2n] ≤
∞∑
n=1
α2n =
1
1− α2 <∞.
Interestingly, the first-order term of this series expansion, i.e.
E
[
(
∑T
t=1Wt)
2
T
−
T∑
t=1
E[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1]2
]
,
is precisely the expression of the minimax regret for the game (ℓ(z, f) = (z − f)2, [−1, 1], [−1, 1])
which is known to have optimal regretΘ(log(T )), see Section 7.3 of [2]. This motivates the introduc-
tion of the probability distribution p used in [2] to establish the Ω(log(T )) lower bound. Specifically,
we use the conditional distributions:
pt(Wt = w|W1, · · · ,Wt−1) =
{ 1+ctW1:t−1
2 if w = 1
1−ctW1:t−1
2 if w = −1
t = 2, · · · , T
where W1:t−1 =
∑t−1
τ=1Wτ and the sequence (ct)t=1,··· ,T is recursively defined as:
cT =
1
T
ct−1 = ct + c2t t = T, · · · , 2.
Together with W1 taken as a Rademacher random variable, these conditional distributions define a
joint distribution p as it can be shown that ct ∈ [0, 1t ]. Abernethy et al. [2] show that:
E
[
(
∑T
t=1Wt)
2
T
−
T∑
t=1
E[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1]2
]
= log(T ) +O(log log(T )). (4)
Hence, it remains to control the terms of order n ≥ 2 in the series expansion. First observe that, by
definition:
E[W 2n1:T ] = E[E[W
2n
1:T |W1, · · · ,WT−1]]
= E[
1 + ctW1:T−1
2
(W1:T−1 + 1)2n +
1− ctW1:T−1
2
(W1:T−1 + 1)2n]
= 1 +
n∑
k=1
(
(
2n
2k
)
+
(
2n
2k − 1
)
cT )E[(W1:T−1)2k],
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which implies that:
|c2n−1T E[W 2n1:T ]− (c2n−1T + 2nc2nT )E[W 2n1:T−1]| ≤
(
2n
2(n− 1)
)
cT + 2
n∑
k=0
(
2n
2k
)
c2T
≤ 2n2cT + 24nc2T ,
(5)
since cT |W1:T−1| ≤ 1. Additionally, we have, using the recursive definition of the sequence
(ct)t=1,··· ,T :
c2n−1T−1 = (cT + c
2
T )
2n−1
=
2n−1∑
k=0
(
2n− 1
k
)
c2n−1+kT ,
which implies:
|c2n−1T−1 − (c2n−1T + (2n− 1)c2nT )| ≤ 2n2c2n+1T + 4nc2n+2T . (6)
Using E[WT |W1, · · · ,WT−1] = cTW1:T−1, we get:
|E[c2n−1T W 2n1:T−
T∑
t=1
E[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1]2n]|
≤ |E[(c2n−1T + 2(n− 1)c2nT )W 2n1:T−1]−
T−1∑
t=1
E[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1]2n]|
+ 2n2cT + 24
nc2T
≤ |E[c2n−1T−1 W 2n1:T−1 −
T−1∑
t=1
E[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1]2n]|
+ (2n2c2n+1T + 4
nc2n+2T )E[W
2n
1:T−1] + 2n
2cT + 24
nc2T
≤ 4n2cT + 34nc2T
≤ 4n2 1
T
+ 34n
1
T 2
,
where the first (resp. second) inequality is obtained by applying (5) (resp. (6)) and the fifth inequality
is derived using cT ∈ [0, 1T ] and |W1:T−1| ≤ T − 1. By induction on t, we get:
|E
[
c2n−1T W
2n
1:T −
T∑
t=1
E[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1]2n
]
| ≤ 4n2
T∑
t=1
1
t
+ 34n
T∑
t=1
1
t2
≤ 4n2 log(T ) + 4nπ
2
2
.
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Bringing everything together, we derive:
|
∞∑
n=2
(1
2
n
)
α2nE
[
(
∑T
t=1Wt)
2n
T 2n−1
−
T∑
t=1
E[Wt|W1, · · · ,Wt−1]2n
]
|
≤ 4(
∞∑
n=2
(1
2
n
)
α2nn2) log(T )
+ (
∞∑
n=2
(1
2
n
)
(2α)2n)
π2
2
≤ 8α4(
∞∑
n=2
n(n− 1)(α2)n−2) log(T )
+ (
∞∑
n=0
(2α)2n)
π2
2
≤ 8 α
4
(1 − α2)3 log(T ) +
π2
2(1− 2α)
≤ 8 α
4
(1 − α2)3 log(T ) + π
2,
since α ≤ 14 . Using (4), we conclude that:
RT (ℓ, Z˜,F) ≥ ‖z
∗‖α2
2
(1− 16 α
2
(1 − α2)3 ) log(T ) +O(log log(T )),
which implies that RT (ℓ, Z˜,F) = Ω(log(T )) as α2(1− 16 α2(1−α2)3 ) > 0 for α ∈ (0, 132 ].
4.13 Proof of Lemma 7
The proof is along the same lines as for Theorem 4. We start with the same inequality:
rT ((zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T ) ≤
T∑
t=1
zTt (ft − ft+1),
and use sensitivity analysis to control this last quantity. Specifically, we show that the mapping
φ : z → argminf∈F zTf is 1q−1 -Hölder continuous on Z , i.e. there exists c > 0 such that:
‖φ(z1)− φ(z2)‖2 ≤ c ‖z1 − z2‖
1
q−1
2 ∀(z1, z2) ∈ Z2.
Using this property, we get:
rT ((zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T ) ≤
T∑
t=1
‖zt‖2 ‖ft − ft+1‖2
= O(
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1t− 1
t−1∑
τ=1
zτ − 1
t
t∑
τ=1
zτ
∥∥∥∥∥
1
q−1
2
)
= O(
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1t(t− 1)
t−1∑
τ=1
zτ − 1
t
zt
∥∥∥∥∥
1
q−1
2
)
= O(
T∑
t=1
(
1
t(t− 1)
∥∥∥∥∥
t−1∑
τ=1
zτ
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
1
t
‖zt‖2)
1
q−1 )
= O(
T∑
t=1
1
t
1
q−1
),
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from which we derive that rT ((zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T ) = O(log(T )) if q = 2 and
rT ((zt)t=1,··· ,T , (ft)t=1,··· ,T ) = O(T
q−2
q−1 ) if q ∈ (2, 3].
We now move on to show that φ is 1
q−1 -Hölder continuous. Just like in Theorem 4, we can find
A > 0 such that ‖z‖2 ≥ A for all z ∈ Z . Take (z1, z2) ∈ Z2 and (f1, f2) ∈ φ(z1) × φ(z2). Since
we are optimizing a linear function, we may assume, without loss of generality, that C = 1 and f1
and f2 lie on the boundary of F , i.e. ‖f1‖F = ‖f2‖F = 1. By definition, we have:∥∥∥∥f1 + f22
∥∥∥∥
F
≤ 1− δF (‖f1 − f2‖F ).
As a consequence, we have:
f1 + f2
2
− δF (‖f1 − f2‖F)
z2
‖z2‖F
∈ F .
We get:
zT2(
f1 + f2
2
− δF(‖f1 − f2‖F )
z2
‖z2‖F
) ≥ inf
f∈F
zT2f = z
T
2f2.
Rearranging this last inequality yields:
zT2
f1 − f2
2
≥ ‖z2‖
2
2
‖z2‖F
δF (‖f1 − f2‖F ),
which implies that:
zT2
f1 − f2
2
≥ K ‖f1 − f2‖q2 ,
for some K > 0 independent of z1 and z2 since Z is compact, ‖z2‖2 ≥ A > 0, ‖ ‖F is q-uniformly
convex, and by the equivalence of norms in finite dimensions. By optimality of f1, we also have
zT1
f2−f1
2 ≥ 0. Summing up the last two inequalities, we get:
(z2 − z1)T f1 − f2
2
≥ K ‖f1 − f2‖q2 ,
and (by Cauchy-Schwartz):
‖z2 − z1‖2 ≥ 2K ‖f1 − f2‖q−12 ,
which concludes the proof.
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